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RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S HUMAN
RIGHTS THROUGH EVE SEDGWICK
DARREN ROSENBLUM*
Thanks to Janet Halley and Jeannie Suk for organizing this amazing
workshop. Since the death of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, I have wanted to
honor her memory, and this panel is the perfect venue. Sedgwick's founda-
tional understandings of sexuality, gender, and identity set the stage for
much of my work and that of those I admire.
My own work looks at how the state regulates gender in the "public"
sphere.' I attempt to challenge the tensions and intersections among interna-
tional and comparative notions of equality and identity. 2 Group identity con-
structions vary across cultural lines and conflict with liberal notions of
universalist constitutionalism and equality.' My current work, Unsex
CEDAW: What's Wrong with Women's Rights,4 continues the exploration of
identity in focusing on an interrogation of the term "women" as deployed by
international law in the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women ("CEDAW"). I argue that the centrality of this
identitarian category of "women" in international law delegitimizes the gen-
der concerns of other groups: transgender people, men of all types, and wo-
men whose rights do not relate to a victim-based identity. I conclude that
CEDAW should not focus on women, but rather should attend to the non-
identitarian categories of "sex" or "gender." Given that this is where my
* Professor, Pace Law School. Thanks to Katherine Franke for her insightful com-
ments on Sedgwick's masochism and to Janet Halley and Noa Ben-Asher for their com-
ments on this presentation. Thanks to Hilary C. Atkin, Matthew Collibee, Christa
D'Angelica, and Nicholas W. Tapert for their research support.
'Elsewhere I have examined extensively and pulled apart the public-private dichot-
omy. See, e.g., Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: The Economic Imperative for
Women's Corporate Leadership, 7 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (arguing that
Norway's Corporate Board Quota, which sets a floor of forty percent for either gender on
publicly-listed corporate boards of directors, serves as a model for a symbiosis between
public and private sectors).
2 Fourteen years ago, I began a line of inquiry related to identity with a queer interro-
gation of "lesbian and gay" identity. See Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and
the Failure of Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 L. & SEXUALrrY 83 (1994).
1 See Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based Equal-
ity Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L.REv. 2873 (2008). In particular, I have closely examined
France's Parity Law, which requires that political parties name women as half of their
candidates for public office. See Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender
Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAvIs L.REv.
1119 (2006). I have also examined Brazil's Quota Law, which requires thirty percent of
political parties be comprised of women. See Darren Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender:
Why International Law Theory Should Adopt Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT L L. 759 (2007). Norway's Corporate Board Quota served as the subject of a separate
Article. See Rosenblum, supra note 1.
4 Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW: What's Wrong with Women's Rights (Aug. 23,
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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current thinking resides, this Panel's focus on the "Affective Family" for me
necessarily draws my attention to the ways that the "public" space con-
structs the family. Sedgwick and Freud both provide lenses through which
to understand the family in all its private and public richness.' In particular,
Sedgwick's lighthearted genderfuck theory is a delicacy for legal scholars-
if legal scholarship has a unifying ethos it is a faith in the work/play binary
and a near complete investment in the former category. For example,
Sedgwick quotes Bette Midler's nightclub act use of a Sophie Tucker joke:
"My fella said to me, Sophie, the problem with you is, you've got no tits,
plus your pussy's too tight. I told him Harry, get off my back."6
Reading Sedgwick reminds us that play and playfulness allow us to
engage in a freer legal analysis. Freud's scientific dissection of masochistic
fantasies plays the perfect straight-laced foil to Sedgwick. Reading both es-
says made me rethink my consideration of international women's human
rights ("IWHR") law.
FREUD AND SEDGWICK ON MASOCHISM
Before getting to IWHR, I begin with a quick summary of the two
essays. Freud's interpretation of masochism creates a taxonomy of at least
three distinct beating fantasies that a child may experience: 1) my father is
beating the (meaning, another) child; 2) 1 am being beaten by my father; 3) a
child is being beaten-and I am watching.7
The first phase of these fantasies is a sadistic revenge fantasy, "com-
pletely represented by the phrase: 'My father is beating the child.' Modify
that-Freud says it's about "'[m]y father is beating the child-whom I
hate."' 9 The second phase shifts this external scene to the child's own body,
as the child develops the masochistic desire to be beaten. The second phase
is thus represented by the phrase, "'I am being beaten by my father."' This
statement, Freud points out, is "unmistakably masochistic."'' 0 This phase is
the most important but never becomes conscious. "It is a construction of
analysis, but it is no less a necessity on that account."" Thus the child
desires the beating but never becomes aware of this longing.
This masochistic fantasy revolves around one of Freud's crucial contri-
butions to Western thought-the power of the subconscious. The third
phase involves the sadistic observation of several children watching yet an-
' EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, A Poem is Being Written, in TENDENCIES 177 (1993);
SIGMUND FREUD, "A Child is Being Beaten," in FREUD ON WOMEN: A READER 215 (Eliza-
beth Young-Bruehl ed., 1990).
6 SED WICK, supra note 5, at 196.
FREUD, supra note 5.
8 ld. at 222.
91d.
'Old. at 223.
1 Id.
[Vol. 33
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Rethinking International Women's Human Rights
other child being beaten. It is an extension of the first phase, but draws on
the eroticism of the second phase, and has a "strong and unambiguous sex-
ual excitement attached to it, and so provides a means for masturbatory
satisfaction." 2
Freud embellishes his definition of masochism. He asserts that beyond
the passivity in the child's beating fantasy, another characteristic affixes to
masochism "unpleasure ... a bewildering accompaniment to the satisfaction
of an instinct."' 3 For Freud, the "transformation of sadism into masochism"
follows from a "sense of guilt which takes part in the act of repression,"
satisfied by the beating.' 4 The repression of this fantasy makes the genital
organization unconscious and forces a regression to an earlier sadistic-anal
stage. Most importantly, it "transforms the sadism of this state into masoch-
ism, which is passive and again in a certain sense narcissistic."' 5 At the
same time, in the masochistic fantasy, "being beaten also stands for being
loved (in a genital sense)."' 6 Freud's contribution to the understanding of
this phenomenon cannot be underestimated: he raised the centrality of the
subconscious, the involvement of core elements of a child's development in
these fantasies, and the role of guilt and indeed love in them.
Sedgwick's essay diligently avoids the scientific objectivity of Freud
with theory, her own poetry, and some mischievousness, all in the first per-
son. When she discusses masochism, there is no doubt it is her own. She
draws a direct parallel between poetry and punishment:
The lyric poem, known to the child as such by its beat and by a
principle of severe economy (the exactitude with which the frame
held the figure)-the lyric poem was both the spanked body, my
own body or another one like it for me to watch or punish, and at
the same time the very spanking, the rhythmic hand whether hard
or subtle of authority itself. What child wouldn't be ravenous for
dominion in this place? Among the powers to be won was the
power to brazen, to conceal, to savage, to adorn, or to abstract the
body of one's own humiliation; or to perhaps most wonderful, to
identify with it, creating with painful love and care, but in a tempo-
rality miraculously compressed by the elegancies of language, the
distance across which this body in punishment could be endowed
with an aura of meaning and attraction-across which, in short,
the compelled body could be chosen."
Sedgwick here subverts Freud's presumption that masochism arises only be-
low the radar of self-awareness. She goes to the core of the narcissism in
12 Id.
1
31d. at 231.
14 Id.
15Id.
'6 Id. at 235.
"7 SEDGWICK, supra note 5, at 184.
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masochism-the craving to be "chosen." Masochism also liberates
Sedgwick from presumptions of gender normativity. She constantly reaches
for a sex and sexual identities beyond the biological assignment of woman-
hood. In addition to the play on anal eroticism of the Sophie Tucker joke,
she refers to herself as a gay man, a comment that suggests a feminism
beyond fetishizing women's identity. 8
In short, for Sedgwick, masochism empowers the subversive, the queer,
the explicitly anal-erotic side of her identity. Feminists reading Sedgwick
cannot avoid thinking that one's sexuality and gender identity may not fit
neatly into rote, Left-centered equality visions. Jungian psychology explains
the elusiveness of these egalitarian visions of sexuality. Jungian psycholo-
gist Robert Johnson argues in his book, Owning Your Own Shadow, that
embracing one's dark side yields positive achievements.' 9 Sedgwick's essay
embodies this understanding of the relationship between the positive and
negative aspects of our lives.
THE VICTIM'S CENTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS
On their face, theories of masochism would have no link whatsoever to
IWHR. Individuals with sexual freedom engage in masochistic sexual prac-
tices. In contrast, IWHR attempts to guarantee rights to women who pur-
18 Sedgwick says:
In among the many ways I do identify as a woman, the identification as a gay
person is a firmly male one, identification "as" a gay man; and in among its
tortuous and alienating paths are knit the relations, for me, of telling and of know-
ing. (Perhaps I should say that it is not to me as a feminist that this intensively
loaded male identification is most an embarrassment; no woman becomes less a
woman through any amount of "male identification," to the extent that female-
ness is always (though always differently) to be looked for in the tortuousness, in
the strangeness of the figure made between the flatly gendered definition from an
outside view and the always more or less crooked stiles to be surveyed from an
inner. A male-identified woman, even if there could thoroughly be such a thing,
would still be a real kind of woman just as (though no doubt more inalterably
than) an assimilated Jew is a real kind of Jew: more protected in some ways, more
vulnerable in others, than those whose paths of identification have been different,
but as fully of the essence of the thing.)
Id. at 209-10.
9 ROBERT A. JOHNSON, OWNING YOUR OWN SHADOW (1993). Jung believes every
human mind has elements of rationality and logic as well as a complimentary sense of
unstructured intuition. CARL G. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGIcAL TYPES (1971); see also Sam
Joyner, A Planetary Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence: If Men are from Mars and Women
are from Venus, Where Do Lawyers Come From?, 33 TULSA L.J. 1019, 1021 (1998)
(citing Jung). Neither side is superior and some people's minds are in balance (which is
considered the healthiest type of personality). The rational and logical capacities are
traditionally associated with men and the feeling side is traditionally associated with wo-
men. Although the logical capacity is more dominant in men and the intuitive capacity is
more dominant in women, "the distinction does not always fall along gender lines." Id.
at 1022.
[Vol. 33
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Rethinking International Women's Human Rights
portedly have little or no sexual freedom. Indeed, it's a big gulf, but let's
cross it.
Several scholars have explored the centrality of framing women as vic-
tims in IWHR. Dianne Otto most eloquently points to CEDAW's reference
to prostitution as an example of the importance of the victim subject in
CEDAW. The CEDAW provision calling for the "suppression . . . of the
exploitation of prostitution of women" exemplifies the vulnerable female
representation's presence in the document. 0 By not acknowledging any
"right" to sex work, CEDAW characterizes " . . . all prostitution as 'ex-
ploitation,"' and all sex workers as in need of protection from those who
exploit them.2 Positing that women are sexualized victims relies on the cur-
rency of (MacKinnon-style 22) essentialist notions of both sex and culture in
the IWHR arena. 23
IWHR's emphasis on the victim subject overlooks multi-layered exper-
iences that take into account perspectives of class, race, religion, ethnicity,
and/or sexual orientation.24 This posture marginalizes and disempowers wo-
men in the developing world.25 These women victim subjects need states to
20 Dianne Otto, Disconcerting 'Masculinities': Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s)
of International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST AP-
PROACHES 105, 118-19 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005).
2 Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
22 Catharine MacKinnon's scholarship attempts to demonstrate how the legal system
is fundamentally opposed to women's interests and designed to perpetuate male domi-
nance. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (1987). Her "work centers on the domination of women in the sexual sphere, high-
lighting rape, sexual harassment, and pornography." MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUC-
TION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 45 (2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2003). MacKinnon asserts
that "the sexual use and abuse of women is the principal mechanism by which women's
subordination is perpetuated." Id. During the 1990s, Mackinnon worked to mobilize
people against the mass rapes of thousands of Muslim and Croatian girls and women by
the Serbian military, who used rape as a tactic of "ethnic cleansing." See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5
(1994). "MacKinnon was enraged that the rapes were not recognized as violations of
human rights, even though convincing legal arguments could be made that they consti-
tuted crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other violations of international law."
CHAMALLAS, supra, at 112. MacKinnon saw the rapes as "a sexual tactic designed to
achieve political ends." Id.
23 See Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Na-
tive" Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 1, 2 (2002). Essentialism is the "fixing of certain attributes to women" that are "con-
sidered to be shared by all women ..... Id. at 7. Sedgwick's point discussed in footnote
18, supra, points to ways in which essentialism remains subject to complexity even
within its own terms. Kapur also posits that women's "experiences of gender oppression
cannot be extricated from their experiences of racial oppression because they occur si-
multaneously." Id. at 8. Catharine MacKinnon played a crucial role in establishing the
meaning of sex and rape in international law. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of
War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1993); see also Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
940 (2006).
24 Kapur, supra note 23, at 8.
25 Id. at 6; see also Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The "Honor" of the
"East" and the "Passion" of the "West," 1997 UTAH L.REv. 287, 290 (1997). Lama
2010]
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protect them, opening the door to their moral regulation. 6 This moral regu-
lation can serve to imprison women in a second wave sexual paradigm. In
this recreated attic reverberating with yellow wallpaper, it is not men's per-
ception of women's hysteria that traps them, but women's own obsession
with victimhood. 27
Janet Halley's Injury Triad clarifies the preeminence of victimhood in
IWHR. The Injury Triad is "female injury + female innocence + male im-
munity. '2 The combination of the self-perception of constitutional inno-
cence and a presumption of male guilt leads some feminists to draw
significant policy conclusions from circumstances that involve a great deal
more nuance. We could say that the Injury Triad explains the lack of self-
consciousness within women's human rights efforts.
Some feminists object to this argument by noting that women are in-
deed often victims, that in violence between sexes, they are far more likely
to be victims, and that their victimization surpasses that of men. I do not
deny that this may be the case. The point here, as supported by Kapur, Otto,
and Halley, is that the victim frame-the representation even of victimized
women this way-empties women of their agency.
MIGHT SEDGWICK'S MASOCHISM LIBERATE THE VICTIM SUBJECT?
The victim subject in IWHR finds herself trapped in a set of presump-
tions about her sexual agency. It's a very second-wave affair in which wo-
men engage with sexuality through their victim status rather than despite it.
Karen Engle's work on rape as a war crime in Bosnia rejects Catharine
MacKinnon's presumptions about sexuality in war.29 Janet Halley, in Rape
at Rome, charges the international women's movement with a punitive
criminalizing thrust.30 Both move beyond the victim subject.
Abu-Odeh notes in her article the connection between a crime of "passion" in the
"West" and "honor" killings in the "East." Id. Abu-Odeh exposes the "deep similari-
ties between the internal tensions within each legal system as to what constitutes a killing
of women that is legally tolerated (either fully or partially), and that these tensions, al-
though sometimes defined differently, have been surprisingly resolved in the same way."
ld.
26 Abu-Odeh, supra note 25, at 293.
27 See generally CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILLMAN, THE YELLOW WALLPAPER (1899).
2 8 JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM
324 (2006).
29 See Karen Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 778 (2005). In this piece, Engle embraces
agency as a fundamental theoretical commitment for international law purposes. Id. She
critiques Catharine MacKinnon's legal construction of rape as a war crime. Id. at 780.
Engle posits that such an approach to rape achieves the goals of international law but robs
sexual agency from the very women it purports to protect. Id.
30 See generally Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminal-
ization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1 (2008).
[Vol. 33
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Rethinking International Women's Human Rights
The key word in this move is agency. Dianne Otto's critique of wo-
men's movement constructions of women's sexuality points to the need for
more theoretical investment in agency. 3' Third-wave feminist visions of sex-
uality involve much more liberating visions of women's sexual potentiali-
ties.32 If women's sexual agency is what's missing in IWHR, how does
masochism have the potential to reintroduce it?
For Sedgwick, masochism provides a rich form of empowerment. She
luxuriates in it, drawing not only horror but also pleasure from fantasies of
spanking and other punishment.33 Her masochistic eros is far from self-ef-
facing or self-erasing; it places her at the center of the scenarios envisioned.
This erotic imaginary involves subversive sexual practices outside of Gayle
Rubin's "Charmed Circle, '3 4 practices that disturb bourgeois sexual norma-
tivity. Here we see the power in disturbing an equality-driven feminist sexu-
ality. Sedgwick's choices have implications in the legal domain.
Masochists have a tight relationship with the law--particularly contract
law, as Gilles Deleuze explores in his Presentation of Sacher-Masoch: The
Cold and the Cruel.35 Deleuze offers a close analysis of the founding text of
masochism, Venus in Furs, written in 1870 by Leopold Von Sacher-
Masoch.36 Venus in Furs describes a man, Severin von Kusiemski, who re-
quests to be the slave of a woman, Wanda, of whom he is enamored.37 He
encourages her to treat him in progressively more degrading ways.3 8 As
Deleuze says, "le sadique a besoin des institutions, mais le masochiste, de
relations contractuelles."3 9 In a rough translation, the sadist needs institu-
3' See Otto, supra note 20, at 106.
32See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young
Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99 (2007).
" See SEDGWICK, supra note 5, at 180 (stating that while "we were always spanked,
in a careful orchestration of spontaneity and pageantry, 'simply' over the parental lap, the
spanking in my imagination ... has always occurred over a table scaled precisely to the
trunk of the child, framing it with a closeness and immobilizing exactitude").
3 Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Racial Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,
in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267 (Carole S. Vance ed.,
1984).
31 Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, in MASOCHISM: COLDNESS AND CRUELTY
AND VENUS IN FURS 8 (Jean McNeil trans., 1991).
36 L. Sacher-Masoch, Venus in Furs, in MASOCHISM: COLDNESS AND CRUELTY AND
VENUS IN FURS 143 (Jean McNeil trans., 1991).
37 Id.
11 At the end of the book, Wanda meets a man to whom she would like to submit and
offers Severin to be used by her new lover, who whips him. Severin leaves Wanda. The
book closes by stating:
[W]oman, as nature made her and as she attracts men currently, is the enemy of
men and can only be for him a slave or a tyrant, but never a companion. She
cannot be that until she will equal him in rights and she will deserve it by her
education and work. For now, we only have one choice: to be the hammer or the
anvil .... Of which the moral of the story: he who lets himself get whipped
deserves to be whipped.
Id. at 271.
39 Deleuze, supra note 35, at 20.
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tions, but the masochist [depends on] contractual relations. The masochist
defines the punishment and secures it through contractual agreement.
Deleuze's discussion of the juridical spirit of masochism exposes the narcis-
sism in masochismS--both Freud and Sedgwick insist that masochism is
about being chosen. The difference between the two is that for Freud it's a
diagnosis, observed by the doctor but passing only in the subconscious of the
patient; for Sedgwick, being "chosen" is a form of resistance and empower-
ment. Sedgwick's choice reflects Deleuze's contractual interpretation of
masochism.
IWHR resolutely frames women as victims and indeed foregrounds wo-
men's victimhood as if it were the only route to legal rights. In so doing, it
trades in the wrong kind of suffering, one in which women are placed on the
"bottom" without choosing. Like masochism, this suffering involves "a
willingness or tendency to subject oneself to unpleasant or trying exper-
iences,' 41 but not the deriving of pleasure from such deprivation. By con-
trast, Sedgwick's masochism, or even Deleuze's masochism, would involve
agreeing to be at the receiving end of punishment, and enjoying it.
Sedgwick's masochism involves agency-she contemplates the spankings
and then eroticizes them.4 1 Sedgwick's masochism involves some jouis-
sance-the enjoyment of the perverse pleasure in suffering.
For IWHR, adherence to this victim status as the source of rights is
another form of enslavement, but not one that involves pleasure. Were
IWHR to surmount victimhood's primacy in women's sexual identity, it
would liberate the rights discourse. The masochist position would then be to
frame women as not victims. 43 In a counterintuitive way, embracing
Sedgwick's masochism may, in some material sense, liberate women.
40 Id. at 30.
41 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1223 (4th ed.
2000) (defining masochism).
42 For a discussion of agency in spanking, see generally Ummni Khan, A Woman's
Right to be Spanked: Testing the Limits of Tolerance of SM in the Socio-Legal Imaginary,
18 L. & Sexuality 79 (2009).
43 Note that here I am not speaking about masochism literally as a sexual practice,
but rather its role in a gendered imaginary. Janet Halley discusses sadism and masochism
as they figure in Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993):
Once we really do admit masochism into our vocabulary of sexual pleasures, we
make it hard to know that any particular social outcome involving sexuality
broadly conceived is a cost or a benefit, a good or a bad. Even there, we must-
constantly, existentially, pragmatically, and in uncertainty-decide.
HALLEY, supra note 28, at 363.
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